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Organizational Routines and Cognition: 
Introduction to the Special Issue on Routines 
 
Nathalie Lazaric 






This article introduces this special issue on routines. It offers some suggestions as to why the concept 
of routines is considered central in methodological considerations of capabilities and organizational 
evolution. The contributors to this special issue propose various analytical tools, and provide some 
missing pieces from the puzzle related to the prominent role of routines. Issues discussed in the papers 
include methodological individualism. Routines lie between the individual and the firm levels of 
analysis because they are enacted by individuals in a social context. It is also suggested that a 
multilevel research agenda provides a finer grained analysis because organizational routines are not 




























In everyday language, a routine is regarded as automatic behavior, in contrast to designed and 
implemented strategic plans (Cohen, 2006, 2007; Lazaric 2008). Routines are sometimes seen as 
unconscious acts, while decision-making is deliberate and intentional. This interpretation, which is 
still shared by some researchers, is unlikely to progress the scientific debate and is out of line with 
current research on routines. At least since Nelson and Winter (1982), routines are seen as pertaining 
to organized groups, rather than individuals. Contemporary studies in the cognitive, social and 
organizational sciences are further refining our use of this concept, involving the notion of procedural 
memory (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994), or recurrent interaction patterns  (Cohen et al., 1996) and 
involving change driven by individuals (Feldman, 2000). These complementary views acknowledge 
the role of individuals and organizations in building new routines. 
 
The concept of routines is at the center of methodological considerations of capabilities and 
organizational evolution according to Salvato and Rerup (2010) and Rerup and Feldman (2011). These 
authors suggest unpacking the organizational ‘black box’ in order to grasp the organizational 
complexity of the notion of routines. Along these lines, there needs to be an easier connection between 
the micro and macro levels of this concept. Contributors to this special issue propose various 
analytical tools, but are in consensus about the need to make progress in this direction. Their diverse 
insights provide some of the missing pieces in the puzzle and suggest a revised research agenda for 
observing the prominent role of routines in everyday life. Every ’recurrent interaction pattern‘ in an 
organization may be hiding a potential routine. However, not every interaction constitutes a routine, 
which means that some clarification is required to avoid inaccurate labeling. The definition provided 
by Pentland (2011) who emphasizes that organizational routines are ’a repetitive recognizable patterns 
of interdependent actions, carried out by multiple actors‘(Feldman and Pentland 2003: 93), is a good 
starting point. This should not prevent us from continuing the debate since many components of 
routines are previously-invisible sub-patterns that emerge through the repetition of sequences of 
actions, but were not designed intentionally by the actors involved. The question should perhaps be 
why do routines emerge, and in what context, and how are these actions intermingled in the 
organizational layers that support and enable their creation? The contributors to this special issue 
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propose different solutions to these questions. We can investigate these frameworks without any 
pretensions to classifying the appropriateness or accuracy of the arguments.  
 
Most of the contributors support the idea that routines emerge to coordinate actions into the division of 
labor within organizations. But is there an ‘invisible hand’ working to aggregate these various actions? 
Management and authority appear to be good candidates for the formulation of routines, but were they 
the only triggers this would mean that organizations were purely bureaucratic processes responding to 
simplistic feedbacks. The emergence of organizational principles can be interpreted in various ways, 
some of which we investigate here. We are interested also in ‘where to look’ to paraphrase Pentland 
(2011).  
 
Micro-foundations and methodological individualism 
For some authors, methodological individualism is a pre-requisite for understanding the intra-
organizational dimension of routines and their motivational components (Abell et al., 2008). Felin and 
Foss (2011) claim that individuals are a central and crucial piece in the puzzle. That said, 
methodological individualism is prone to ambiguity and is used in different ways. For instance, it is 
not always made clear whether it is being proposed that social phenomena should be explained in 
terms of individuals or social phenomena should be explained by individuals plus relation between 
individuals (Hodgson, 2007: 97). As Hodgson notes, the second option paves the way for including 
social structures as an explanatory variable and thus to re-frame the debate. For escaping this 
dichotomy on methodological individualism versus methodological collectivism, Giddens (1982) and 
others see agents and structures as inclusive mechanisms, i.e.  a source of a permanent creation with 
enabling and constraining forces.  
 
 At first glance, there would seem to be simple disagreement between the proponents of 
methodological individualism and the defenders of the multilevel perspective. However, the 
controversy goes deeper, since the authors bring their own epistemological and ontological visions of 
routines and organizations. This is not new (Lazaric, 2000), but since these discussions have not been 
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resolved, they are re-debated from the perspective of the organizational structure and its foundations. 
For instance, Teppo and Felin (2011) consider these issues from the point of view of individuals. 
Individualism and other causal mechanisms appear to be critical for understanding organizational 
management, notably how intentional human action and diverse interactions produce certain strategic 
phenomena (Abell et al., 2008: 492). Starting from Coleman’s (1990) insights, Abell et al. try to build 
the micro-foundations of management, which they maintain are required to capture firm outcomes and 
to avoid a too simplistic vision of their micro complexities. Micro-foundations are important because 
‘the individual level considerations have been consistently black boxed in the received capabilities 
view’ (Abell et al., 2008: 494). In this latter perspective, in order to get a better understanding of the 
routinization process, the formalization of routines should integrate key insights from the economic 
theory of the firm as depicted by such authors as Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Holmström (1982). 
In sum:  
 
 How things are done in organizational settings, both in terms of structure and overall 
efficiency or creativeness, is a function of who is doing. Even in highly routinized 
environments, the origins of heterogeneous routines are fundamentally at the individual 
level. (Felin and Foss: 2005: 450).  
 
For this reason, ’collective structures are dependent on the individuals who make up the organization‘ 
(ibid: 450). Felin and Foss (2011) go a step further, claiming that the behavioral roots of this debate 
impede organizations from fully integrating feedbacks in a manner suitable to deal with novelties. 
According to them the ’poverty of stimulus‘ makes organizations more receptive to past experience 
than to becoming inventors of new inputs supported by individuals. In this debate, Hodgson and 
Knudsen (2011) while endorsing the role of human agency, argue that the term ‘methodological 
individualism’ is misleading.  Opposing individuals to social structures creates a false dichotomy. 
Indeed human capacities remain caused and its source of change has multiple ranges of explanation 
going beyond the solely individual arena.  
 
 
Behaviorist roots for the foundation of routines  
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Some misunderstandings about the notion of routines emerge from readings of Nelson and Winter’s 
(1982) book. They do not define this concept as behavioral “lock in” or the product of past behavior, 
but as a source of knowledge that needs constant renewal and new understanding in order to make 
sense within the firm and to achieve appropriate coordination. As Winter (2011) explains in his 
contribution here, the reformulation of this notion based on the heritage of Michael Polanyi transforms 
the ’state of the art‘ through the integration of two important concepts: ’personal knowledge‘ and ’tacit 
knowledge‘ . This integration represents a departure from the traditional Simonian vision of routines 
as programs, an idea diffused by the Carnegie School (see Feldman, 2000 for a discussion). Also, the 
notion of ’personal knowledge‘ implicitly transforms the traditional vision of organizations by 
emphasizing the difficulties involved in articulating and transferring knowledge inside firms and 
enabling the emergence of organizational knowledge not based on initially individual skills.  
Nelson and Winter for many years worked with the Rand Corporation, which oversaw several military 
and civilian technological programs, and they worked closely also with the Carnegie School. Based on 
this experience Nelson and Winter became thoroughly familiar with the radical technical uncertainty 
characterizing innovation. Publication of March and Simon’s (1963) Organizations had a decisive 
impact on the whole scientific community (Nelson, 2006). Nelson and Winter were influenced by this 
book; this led to their consideration of dysfunction in major military organizations and the role of 
institutions in launching technological innovations. They saw the firm as bearing the mark of these 
large structures whose decisions, far from responding to market signals, relied on specific rules. Their 
original Schumpeterian vision of the firm was modulated by their observation of these dysfunctions. 
Instead of the idea of routines evoked by Schumpeter, or Simon’s concept of a program, Nelson and 
Winter reformulated the notion. Their definition of routines is based on several essential questions 
related to where individual skills and organizational knowledge reside, as the basis for a successful 
production process.  
The capacity for firms to survive depends on the transformations that are put in place promoted either 
by the permanent reconfiguration of routines or their new combination. Some transformations are 
motivated by the individual and organizational knowledge present in the firm. The literature tends to 
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focus not on these sources of change but on the changes promoted by exogenous shocks. This 
dynamics is based on Schumpeterian thinking in which firms are continuously motivated to innovate 
in order to survive in a non-stationary environment, and where innovation itself promotes further 
transformations. This implies a double transformation motivated by internal and external forces, 
whose real origins are sometimes difficult to identify (Winter, 2006). In this context, the notion of 
organizational routines, a pillar of the evolutionary edifice, is a source of both stability and change in 
the organization. The idea of change is a difficult one, and many talk of routines and innovation as 
oppositional. However, this hides the underlying organizational reality. Routines evolve according to 
various internal or external pressures and create focal points around which organization members 
agree to organize their work or activities. The outside observer might see only the external forces 
pushing for a modification of routines, but not the internal ‘governance’ pushing for their 
transformation. There is a view that changes to routines are more likely to be determined by changes 
in the environment (Cohen et al., 1996: 683; Andersen, 1994). However, Schumpeterian theory 
reveals two sources of renewal. First, the ’combinatorics of routines‘, which occurs through a 
combination of sub-elements. Although relevant, this approach is undeveloped (Becker, Knudsen and 
March, 2006: 362). Second, the unreliable process of replication of internal elements. Indeed, the 
firm’s ability to copy and/or to extend routines is a source of competitive advantage. This mechanism 
may be imperfect and costly, but can also be a valuable source of evolution and change. Winter (1996) 
develops this in trying to explain the extension and renewal of knowledge bases in a given competitive 
environment (Becker and Lazaric, 2003). Based on the reasons put forward above, Winter (2011) 
explains in his contribution the objections to imputing Skinner-type ‘behaviorist’ arguments to his 
previous work with Nelson.  
 
Organizations and motivational feedbacks 
In their essay Felin and Foss (2011) underline the excessive emphasis placed on experience and 
repetition as the organizational antecedents to routines and capabilities. According to them, lessons 
learned by the organizations are ‘black boxed’, impeding the integration of endogenous sources of 
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novelty. The ‘poverty of stimulus’ illustrates this process where internal elements interfering with 
recurrent internal patterns of interactions are not fully understood. This is a ‘chicken and egg’ type 
problem in the sense that whether and to what extent we are able to differentiate the initial cause from 
the final cause of this organizational process. To escape this circularity, we need to identify the 
emergence of the organizational principles, their origin, legitimacy and potential efficiency. In this 
direction, Rerup and Salvato (2010), advocate for multilevel research on routines and capabilities. 
They suggest that routines should be broken down into sequences of individual actions to understand 
their evolution and effectiveness while ’breaking organization-level routines across hierarchical levels 
to understand the role of different individual rationalities in routines performance‘ (Rerup and Salvato, 
ibid: 14). Observation of individuals in organizations performing different activities and encompassing 
different understandings of routine would seem appropriate. In this context, the problem of the 
’poverty of stimulus‘ can be transformed in feedback opacity inside and outside the organization. 
Individuals have various goals and various motivations which may be in accordance or conflict with 
the organization’s goals. Organizational layers create opacity between individual behavior and 
organizational principles.  
 
For Greve (2008), this opacity stems from the fact that feedbacks in organizations are not automatic, 
and within organizations, multilevel organizational goals tend to make feedback more difficult 
because:  
the organization level sets the goal variables for lower levels ( …) but does not 
directly influence lower level -routine modification. First often the individual behavior 
is part of multi person routines ( ...) as the result the person and the decision are not 
tightly associated. Second the goal is often assigned higher level the specific routines 
(…)[Consequently] the goal and the routine are not tightly associated. In such cases, is 
often not clear whether the individual will feel responsible for making any specific 
change, and that change will be a modification of a routines (Greve, 2008: 199).  
 
In contexts where the feedbacks between hierarchy and individuals are confused, motivational issues 
may be a way of reducing this gap. Witt (2011) claims that we should look more closely at various 
sources of motivation, i.e.  intrinsic and extrinsic ones. Indeed, the expression of individual knowledge 
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inside organizations presupposes sufficient mutual fits in cognitive frames (proposition 2). If 
individuals are sharing the same cognitive framework, identification with organizational goals will be 
easier. Thus, shared cognitive frameworks need to be established among individuals based on common 
knowledge and common goals. This may allow organizations to identify common values reducing the 
cognitive distance between individuals and instilling some coordinating principles. For Witt (2011, 
proposition 4) the sharing of cognitive frameworks and social values enables the identification of 
intrinsic motivations and the building of patterns of recurrent interactions. The self determination 
theory describes motivation as an autonomous variable which may sustain some degree of regulation 
and control (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Deci et al., 1999). Starting from this premise, intrinsic motivation 
refers to performance of an activity because it is interesting and provides rewards in terms of the basic 
psychological need for autonomy, competence and relatedness. This source of motivation involves a 
conscious act and the commitment of individuals to take part in a new learning process.  Extrinsic 
motivation, on the other hand, refers to the performance of an activity because of its instrumental or 
separable external outcomes, e.g. monetary reward (Deci, 2008).  
For Postrel and Rumelt (1992), going beyond individual impulsiveness and executing new routines 
requires new values and learning of new habits. Consequently, incentive systems on their own are not 
sufficient to change routines because they often conflict with employees’ intrinsic motivations (fear of 
instrumentalism and loss of autonomy). As Leibenstein (1987, 1979) explains, authority and hierarchy 
cannot substitute for this deliberate effort and cannot control the daily routines of members because 
they are able to exercise discretionary power. This means that the origin of the effort and, more 
specifically, the conditions under which individuals can reconcile their personal interests with those of 
the organization, become critical. Building intrinsic motivation is difficult because ’individual and 
organizational rationality are engineered “outcomes”, not natural endowments‘ (Postrel and Rumelt, 
1992:432). However, a closer look at this issue might help to clarify some of the discrepancy observed 
between ’ostensive' and ’performative‘ routines, and illustrate the difficulties of trying to control 
routines in the face of individuals’ free will (Feldman and Pentland, 2003).  
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As Feldman (2000) suggests, routines are ’emergent accomplishments‘ that need to be made sense of 
in order to be deployed by workers in the right way (i.e. requiring minimal supervision of their 
application). Social mechanisms are required to support the organization’s values and social goals. In 
this perspective, an ’individualist‘ view of routines may provide a better understanding of the social 
underpinnings that become taken for granted when routines are activated (see also Lazaric and 
Raybaut, 2005;  Zbaracki and Bergen, 2010; Witt, 2011).  
 
Routines as multilevel mechanisms 
Organizational routines, rather than being isolated units may appear to be intertwined with various 
feedbacks (Rerup and Salvato, 2010). The emergence of mechanisms of change stemming from 
individuals, but which have an impact on the organization (‘upward causation‘), and the changes 
within organizations that radically affect individuals (‘reconstitutive downward causation ‘) (Hodgson, 
2007:108) are worthy of investigation. Routines clearly lie between the individual and firm levels of 
analysis because they are enacted by individuals, but within a social context. In his contribution 
Vromen (2011) claims that we should conceive routines as multilevel mechanisms, i.e. patterns of 
behaviors that generate firm behaviors. This proposal helps to broaden our view of routines by 
encompassing others’ interaction mechanisms and by decomposing emergent outcomes and the links 
within and among them. More precisely ‘ it helps in getting a clearer picture of how skills and routines 
are ontologically (rather than metaphorically) related to each other’. Vromen does not claim that his 
standpoint solves all the problems, but that it can be seen as a counter proposal to avoid a takeover by 
reductionist arguments. Pentland (2011) extends the debate and invites us to consider the granularity 
of the routines for appreciating their ‘practical consequences’. For him, the intersection between action 
and experience matters especially in the context of ecologies of routines that emerge in networks such 
as the ’purchase-to-pay cycle‘. He encourages a focus on real routines in order to avoid confusion 
generated ’by disconnecting words from their meaning in practice‘. Based on the empirical evidence, 
former deliberating about foundations should be directed to the tools and methods required to analyze 
them (a similar judgment is found in Becker et al., 2005).  
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Technological artefacts as mediators of activities  
A valuable contribution to this debate in describing how organizational routines co-evolve with 
various technological artefacts and more precisely about how ’artefacts and materiality [are brought] 
to the center of the routines and the Routines Theory‘, is discussed by D’Adderio (2011) in her 
contribution. From this perspective, technological artefacts are sources of new forms of procedural 
memory, but also generate potential rigidity (D’Adderio, 2003, 2008). Artefacts then are ’mediators of 
human cognition and activity‘, and are at the interface between ostensive visions of routines and their 
performance. As a result, they capture, encode and select among performances while having an impact 
on performative routines -and vice versa (D’Adderio, 2011).  
 
This finer grained analysis provides a means of grounding and situating routines and empirical 
research. Pentland recommends some other guidelines to enable a better understanding of the link 
between ’stability and change in routines‘, the links between ’routines and capabilities‘ and the need to 
investigate more fully the ’ecologies of routines‘ (for complementary discussions see Pentland and 
Feldman, 2008 ; Becker and Lazaric, 2009). To sum up and to paraphrase Pentland, in this debate, we 
should always be connected to our object of observation. Routines are often considered to be 
mundane, ordinary ’objects‘ performed in daily life. Thus, in exploring them as ’scientific objects‘ we 
may be tempted increase their complexity as our analytical representations hide our normative vision 
of what organizations are (or what they should be) in some specific context. I invite readers of this 
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